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Australia-New Zealand Defence Cooperation:  
Some Considerations 
Jim Rolfe And Arthur Grimes  
A ustralia and New Zealand have a long history of defence cooperation (currently under the rubric ‘Closer Defence Relations’ or ‘CDR’) based on treaty arrangements, on shared values and on similar, although not 
identical, strategic outlooks.  (Rolfe, 1995).  Each country has always assumed 
that the other would come to its assistance in times of military threat.  At times the 
relationship has been very close at others no more than correct.  No matter the 
state of the relationship however, until recently there has been a mutual acceptance 
of the need for each country to maintain a range of combat capabilities for each of 
the three services within the respective armed forces.  The assumption underlying 
this seems to have been that broadly-based forces at some level of capability 
would be able to work with each other to each other’s advantage and that between 
them the two countries would provide the range and quantity of capabilities 
sufficient to meet any reasonable contingency. 
In 2000 each country published reviews giving a framework for decisions on 
the size and shape of the armed forces for 20 or 30 years (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2000; New Zealand Government, 2000).  Although Australia explicitly 
reaffirmed its need to maintain a wide range of combat capabilities, New 
Zealand’s government argued that ‘a new approach to defence was one of the key 
policies of the Government when it was elected’ (New Zealand Government, 
2000:1).  The implication of this was that there could be no guarantees that 
‘traditional’ approaches to size, shape and capabilities would continue. 
New Zealand did indeed not follow its traditional approach.  Decisions have 
been taken that degrade New Zealand’s combat capacity considerably.  
Specifically, New Zealand has not taken the option to purchase a third Anzac class 
frigate (instead deciding to purchase a ‘multi-role’ naval craft), has deferred any 
enhancement to, or upgrade of, the capabilities of its anti-submarine aircraft, and 
has removed the air combat force completely from the order of battle.  These 
moves, especially the removal of the air combat force, are a significant change in 
the previous strategy of ‘wanting a little bit of most things’ and a significant shift 
away Australia’s position.  Army equipment is to be upgraded, but this will do 
little more than maintain the Army’s capabilities relative to other armies. 
Australia’s public view of any New Zealand move to remove combat 
capabilities (declared before the decisions not to add a third frigate to the fleet and 
to disband the air combat force) is that it ‘would regret any decision ...  not to 
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maintain at least some capable air and naval combat capabilities’ (Commonwealth 
of Australia 2000:42).  A discussion paper prepared before public consultations on 
defence requirements noted that to optimise Australia’s forces for ‘operations 
other than war’ (that is, for humanitarian relief, UN observer missions and the 
like) would be to take Australia ‘down the road of New Zealand’ (Cheeseman 
2000:25).  In private, officials and politicians alike are much more scathing of 
New Zealand’s perceived move to irrelevance in regional strategic matters. 
These moves raise questions about the long-standing assumption that each 
country would act to protect the other.  Australia because it may see New Zealand 
as free-riding and not worthy of assistance unless Australia were directly 
threatened and New Zealand because it would not have the capability.  That 
outcome would be in neither country’s interests.  It may be though, that despite 
New Zealand’s unilateral approach to force structure issues, both countries can 
gain.  Australia because New Zealand’s decisions can be seen as beneficial to both 
countries rather than harmful to Australia and New Zealand because Australia 
would not then see New Zealand as free-riding.   
In this paper we consider an analytical framework that could usefully inform 
policy makers when they consider national force capabilities and the degree to 
which each country can and should cooperate in determining defence structures.  
We use an explicitly economics approach to our analysis.  This takes us away 
from normative policy statements of ‘needs’ (which are often ‘wants’) and gives a 
clear basis for both making and understanding policy decisions.  Initially we 
examine the domestic determinations of an optimal defence force structure for a 
small country such as New Zealand.  The point of this is to determine to what 
extent national force structure ‘balance’ is feasible and either desirable or 
necessary.  We then consider the international considerations facing any small 
country and how balance applies internationally.  Finally, we consider how the 
concept of balance could apply between Australia and New Zealand.  Underlying 
all this is an assumption that Australia and New Zealand have sufficient interests 
in common to make cooperation sensible.  If that is not the case, of course, then 
each country should act unilaterally. 
Most of the literature applying economic concepts to defence force structure 
is written chiefly for and about larger countries (for example, Hartley and Sandler, 
1995; Sandler and Hartley, 1995).  While conceptually the defence structure issues 
facing a small country are similar to those facing a large country, the emphasis 
differs.  For instance, a large country such as the United States will inevitably 
have air, navy and army forces, each with various sub-components (such as strike 
aircraft, bombers and reconnaissance aircraft within the air force).  By contrast, it 
is inevitable that a micro-state such as Tonga will not have all of these force 
components (and sub-components).   
The emphasis in this paper is on issues facing countries that are not in the 
micro-state category, but which nevertheless are small.  New Zealand, with a 
population of a little fewer than 4 million people is in this category, and many of 
the issues it faces are common to other small to medium sized countries, including 
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Australia.  Rolfe (1993 and 1999) gives background on the size and shape of New 
Zealand’s defence forces and on the policy context within which they operate.   
Balance 
‘Balance’ is important, if only as a concept upon which to hang other assertions.  
Defence force planners in New Zealand have regularly asserted that balance is 
essential for the armed forces.  The concept as it applies to the New Zealand 
Defence Force (NZDF) is discussed in New Zealand Government (1991 and 
1997).  One of the ‘Key Result Areas’ for the NZDF has been ‘the enhancement of 
balanced military capabilities’ (New Zealand Defence Force, 2000:39).  By this 
the NZDF has meant that New Zealand should maintain as wide a range as 
possible of conventional military capabilities.  For its part, rather than asserting 
that balance is ‘essential’, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee 
(1999:56) discussed balance as being ‘not the same as saying that New Zealand 
needs a conventional balanced force with three separate services’.  This latter view 
has been adopted by the government.  Balance, in the government’s view is more 
to do with having forces relevant to the tasks required of them than it is with 
having a wider range of forces available for contingencies.  In 2000 New Zealand 
altered its formal position:  ‘available forces will be concentrated in areas where 
are they are most needed’ (New Zealand Government, 2000:12).  Concentration, 
the antithesis of balance as the term had been used by previous government, has 
been manifest by the removal of the air combat force.  
Balance, however, is not a well-defined concept.  New Zealand’s armed 
forces were never ‘balanced’ in any objective sense of the word.  A small-
country’s defence force must inevitably be more specialised (and therefore less 
‘balanced’) than that of the United States, if only because it will not have a nuclear 
capacity.  Policy makers must therefore have a clear idea of what balance means 
and does not mean, in what circumstances it should be aimed for and how it can 
best be achieved.   
Balance is related to the task or tasks required of the forces under discussion.  
At the highest level there is a need, in virtually all countries, for a defence force of 
some kind.  The ability to defend a country’s own sovereignty in response to 
particular real or potential threats is generally considered an essential attribute of 
statehood, and in the worst case may need resort to armed force.  A balanced force 
would be one that could guarantee that security without maintaining more forces 
than necessary to do so.  Regional security (for example, in New Zealand’s case, 
contributions to the security of neighbouring Pacific Island states and of Australia) 
may come next in priority, followed by broader ‘foreign policy’ uses of a 
country’s defence force.  This may be either in conjunction with an allied or 
friendly country (such as with each other or the USA or UK in both Australia and 
New Zealand’s case) or with a multilateral body (such as the United Nations).  
Domestic civil emergency uses may also be important.  The size and degree of 
balance of the armed forces should be determined ultimately by the purposes for 
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which they are intended to be used and the weightings given to each of those 
purposes. 
Balance may be achieved nationally through the overall structure of the 
armed forces, or it may be achieved internationally through coordination across 
countries (for example between Australia and New Zealand).  There may, 
therefore, be a lack of balance at one level and balance at another.  For example, it 
may be sensible for the defence forces to be unbalanced within a country because 
there is little likelihood that they will operate without cooperation with other 
countries, but individual services may be balanced so that they can be sent on 
operations and act more or less independently of support from other countries in 
certain circumstances.  An important question therefore concerns the level at 
which balance is needed.  These questions regarding balance are central to our 
analysis here.   
Small Country Force Structure:  National Considerations  
Of course, any country has both national and international considerations when it 
considers an optimal force structure.  In New Zealand’s case the conventional 
wisdom has been that New Zealand has security interests rather than security 
needs (New Zealand Government, 1991:28).  That being so, force structure will 
not be optimised to defeat any particular enemy or operate in any particular 
environment.  This is different from the case of a country with an enemy of known 
or assumed capabilities on its borders or a country that, as a matter of policy, has 
determined that it will, for example, only defend its own shores and have no 
expeditionary capability at all. 
Domestic considerations relating to an optimal structure for the defence 
forces depend on a number of factors most importantly including: 
 
• the weighting of various objectives set for defence forces; and 
• the aggregate funding available for defence forces. 
Influence of Objectives on Structure 
To show how different broad objectives may influence force structure, assume that 
there are just two objectives for the defence forces.  These may be:  ‘pure 
defence’, relating to sovereignty protection and other warlike operations; and 
support for foreign policies such as through low-level contributions to the United 
Nations, or ‘presence’ rather than war-fighting.  These two categories reflect the 
commonly accepted view that defence forces contribute to multiple, jointly-
produced outputs (see McGuire, 1995; Murdoch, 1995; Sandler and Hartley, 
1995). 
If New Zealand had just one force element, the Army say, the two outputs 
would probably be partially rival and partially non-rival:  an increase in resources 
available for the pure defence roles would increase the resources available to 
support foreign policy aims, but if resources were to be actually employed in 
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either role they would not then be available for the other.  This introduces the 
notion of defence forces being an option.  More force gives an option for greater 
contribution to both objectives, even though use for one may crowd out use for the 
other at any time.1  For New Zealand the concept of option is salient because of 
the accepted wisdom, noted earlier, that the country had defence interests rather 
than defence needs. 
With two or more forces to consider (the Army and the Air Force perhaps), 
the question becomes more complicated.  To illustrate this, consider a force with 
an Army and an Air Force where both are assumed to contribute equally to the 
pure defence function, but only the Army contributes to the objective related to the 
support of the country’s foreign policy (the analysis can be extended to more than 
two force elements, but this merely adds complexity without increasing our 
understanding of the issues).  A balanced force (that is, resources to the Army and 
the Air Force in the proportion of 50:50) maximises the pure defence objective, 
but a completely unbalanced force (that is resources to the Army and the Air Force 
in the proportion of 100:0) maximises the foreign affairs objective as the Air Force 
does not, by assumption, contribute to that in any case.2 It is likely that the 
government’s preferences over both objectives will yield a preferred force 
structure between the two focused on the Army, but with some Air Force elements 
being maintained.  The ratio of resources to each could be set at 70:30.  Such a 
preferred structure is not optimal from a pure defence viewpoint but it is optimal 
from a ‘national’ perspective. 
A practical question then arises as to how advice and decisions about defence 
force structure and funding should be handled.  If, say, the defence forces 
contribute to foreign affairs outputs as well as to pure defence outputs, it makes 
sense for both foreign affairs and defence officials and other experts to advise on 
appropriate force structure to ensure that a range of objectives are met.  Differing 
policy-making structures, therefore, could have quite different implications for 
decisions about force structures.  This takes us into the realm of public choice 
models (Hartley, 1995) with emphasis on the incentives on each agent (including 
lobbyists) to maximise the outputs (or inputs) under their control (Sandler and 
Hartley, 1995:57-58). 
In New Zealand this kind of analysis has now been made implicitly (although 
probably not in any rigorously analytical manner).  This may be seen in the way 
the government has expressed force structure preferences based on the ability of 
the Army to contribute easily to UN operations whereas the Air Force (particularly 
the air combat force) seems to have a more limited role for these operations and 
thus has lost its air combat capability. 
                                                     
1 This is quite different from the trade-off between resources for defence and say arts 
funding: resources used for defence do not give an option for increasing arts outputs 
(except possibly for an army band!). 
2  By our assumption, any force structure with greater than 50 per cent devoted to the 
foreign policy objective results in a deterioration in both pure defence and foreign policy 
objectives.  Hence the only ‘rational’ allocation of resources is between 50: 50 and 100:0 
to the Army and Air Force respectively. 
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Influence of Funding on Structure 
Consider now a situation where there is just one agreed objective for the defence 
forces, that of pure defence, (the analysis could be extended to multiple objectives 
as above, but, again, this would complicate the analysis without shedding light).  
Assume again two potential force elements within the defence force (the Army 
and the Air Force) and consider the role of funding constraints on the optimal 
force structure.  Two particular aspects may be important: 
 
• the way force elements are linked to specific defence outputs; and 
• minimum feasible levels for either or both forces. 
 
Defence outputs 
Consider again the case where defence outputs are a function of the two force 
elements and examine three alternative situations:3 
 
1. We could assume that the total defence output is the sum of expenditures on 
each of the two forces.  In that case both forces should be utilised to the level 
that additional expenditure on one (within the overall budget) produces a 
commensurate increase in capability without detracting from the other.   
2. We could alternatively assume again that there is expenditure on the both the 
Army and the Air Force but that the defence output is duplicated by the two; 
neither does anything that the other does not.  In this case only one force 
element (the most productive one in terms of the desired defence objectives) 
would be employed.   
3. A third case would be where the Army and the Air Force supplement each 
other and one cannot produce any outputs (again, in terms of the desired 
defence objectives) without the other.  In this case, the overall force must be 
balanced to be viable at all. 
 
These examples show that there is no necessary reason for a ‘balanced’ force 
but rather that the relationship of the force elements to the defence objectives is 
important. 
With multiple defence outputs (such as pure defence and support for foreign 
policies) therefore, it is possible that each output will have different requirements.  
For instance pure defence may require balance whereas contributions to UN 
peacekeeping may be indifferent to the needs of balance (it may not much matter 
whether a country contributes an army, navy or air force unit to a multilateral 
                                                     
3  Other writers (for example, Warner and Asch, 1995; Sandler and Hartley, 1995) have 
modelled defence outputs as a function of labour and capital.  Since we are primarily 
interested in force structure, we assume that each force element already embodies an 
optimised combination (for that force element) of labour and capital and the optimisation 
calculation is then conducted over the combination of forces. 
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force provided it contributes something).  In a purely rational world, the 
government would then require Defence to produce a weighted combination of the 
two outputs with weightings determined by government preferences.  In New 
Zealand’s case though, the history of the usage of the armed forces in the last 50 
years and patterns of expenditure on them would seem to indicate that any 
requirements for ‘balance’ across the armed forces have had less to do with 
analysis of the kind discussed and more to do with the kinds of ‘bargaining’ 
described in the public choice models discussed above.   
Funding and feasibility 
The preceding discussion assumed that there were no minimum levels at which 
either force had to be maintained in order for it to be operational.  In practice this 
is not normally the case.  To take this factor into account, assume that the Army is 
operable and can contribute to defence outputs at all levels of expenditure, but that 
the Air Force only contributes once expenditure on it is above a threshold level.   
If expenditure on the Air Force is less than the threshold level, the 
expenditure contributes nothing to defence outputs and is wasted.  It would be 
better to spend nothing on the Air Force and use that expenditure on the Army.  
But is this optimal? There will be some circumstances where it is and some where 
it is not.  This will depend on whether spending to achieve the pure defence output 
is higher under the case where there is insufficient expenditure on the Air Force 
(because the expenditure would be wasted) in which case an unbalanced force 
structure would be optimal.  If on the other hand pure defence is maximised by 
spending on both the Army and the Air Force, then a balanced structure will be 
optimal. 
The analysis has so far taken aggregate spending as given.  However the 
aggregate level of spending has an important interaction with the effect of the 
minimum constraint.  The more spending there is, the less likelihood there is of 
the minimum constraint becoming binding.   
Consider the policy response to a situation where the optimal size of the Air 
Force (given a set total defence expenditure level) is less than the required 
threshold level for effectiveness.  There are several policy choices.  Firstly, the 
government could retain the given levels of expenditure and either adopt an 
otherwise sub-optimal force structure or delete the sub-optimal spending 
altogether.  The choice should depend on the relationship of the Air Force to the 
Army in the broader production of defence outputs.  Secondly, the government 
could increase defence spending beyond the level it wishes to devote to defence 
(resulting in a sub-optimal overall allocation of government expenditure) in order 
to achieve an optimal force structure (viewed purely from a defence force 
perspective).  This indicates a key point:  greater defence expenditure not only 
enables more of the same force elements to be delivered, but also enables more 
types of force elements to be delivered.  The converse also follows.   
Sandler and Hartley (1995) argue that declining real defence budgets require 
a reassessment of force structures both within and across nations.  Noting Pugh’s 
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(1993) analysis that defence costs tend to rise faster than economy-wide costs, 
they contend (Sandler and Hartley, 1995:116) that ‘there are inevitable downward 
pressures on the size and formation of armed forces’ and question the wisdom of 
‘the long-run trend towards a one-ship navy and a one-aircraft air force’. 
This has implications for a small country or, more accurately, for a country 
with a small overall defence budget.  The smaller the defence budget, the more 
likely it is that the country will adopt an ‘unbalanced’ force.  The United States 
will maintain all available forces and sub-sets of forces.  Tonga has virtually none.  
New Zealand (and Australia), being small but not microscopic, will optimally be 
somewhere in between — with the exact number of forces being determined by 
technological and political preference factors.  New Zealand, of course, has 
determined to maintain its defence budget at relatively low levels and delete 
capabilities rather than to increase the budget significantly and give itself more 
options. 
If, given this analysis, it makes sense in certain circumstances to reduce the 
number of force elements (as New Zealand has), why does this frequently not 
happen? One reason suggested by public choice theory is that bureaucratic 
incentives of decision-makers are such that they will not recommend such a policy 
(Sandler and Hartley, 1995:117-119; Rogerson, 1995).  Sandler and Hartley 
(1995:117) claim that instead of rationally prioritising across defence elements in 
relation to equipment procurement, the reality in some countries may be more 
bureaucratic: 
 
In reality, such decisions are often made on the principle of Buggins’ 
Turn.  Last year, the navy obtained its new aircraft carrier; this year it is 
the turn of the air force to receive its new fighter aircraft; next year the 
army can have a new tank! 
 
In New Zealand budgetary considerations are such that expenditure intentions 
are closely scrutinised.  Rarely is there any ability for more than one major 
equipment procurement at a time.  This forces hard decisions and is, in part, the 
reason for the decisions to reduce the naval combat force and remove the air 
combat force.4 
Of course, if there are three force elements (army, navy, air force) but a single 
specialised force is optimal (no matter what ideological opinion is held), public 
choice theory implies that there will always be at least two of the three force 
leaders who advise against specialisation.   
Before finishing this section, we foreshadow briefly discussion of the impact 
that international coordination may have on the structural issues just examined.  
The analysis in this section has considered a single country in isolation.  There is 
one aspect in which international coordination could relieve a critical constraint 
for a small country.   
                                                     
4 Of course, that says nothing about any ideological disposition not to have specific combat 
forces. 
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Recall the case where the country requires both (or all) forces if any defence 
output is to be produced.  If the country can rely on an ally (either formal or 
informal) for provision of one force, then the appropriate production function 
should include the other country’s input of that force to the domestic defence 
effort.  This could result in the adoption of an unbalanced rather than a balanced 
force structure in the smaller country even where an analysis of defence outputs 
produced by each service would mandate a balanced force in the absence of 
international cooperation. 
Keeping the Options Open 
So far our analysis has been entirely static.  However in an uncertain environment, 
once the time to bring forces to an operational capability is taken into account, the 
analysis becomes dynamic and further important complexities are introduced.  In 
these circumstances it may become more costly to specialise because the loss of 
capability arising from the need to bring mothballed forces to readiness must be 
taken into account.   
The impact of this factor on structural choices is, however, complex.  While 
reducing the benefits of specialisation compared with the static case, the need for 
some specialisation by a small country remains.  Quite evidently, the need to 
retain options is not an argument for a small country to maintain all defence 
elements maintained by the United States (submarines, nuclear missiles and the 
like). 
The force elements maintained by a small country may in the real world, 
however, be greater in number than would be the case under a static (and 
probably) theoretical framework and/or will tend to be more ‘generalist’ in nature.  
As an example, if an Air Force is to be maintained, its structure may differ once 
dynamic factors are taken into account.  A static framework with a given 
environment and given objectives may result in choice of one type of aircraft to 
carry out a specific function (such as interception of enemy aircraft).  However 
once environmental or other uncertainties related to the range of possible tasks are 
taken into account, the choice of aircraft may be modified to a model which is 
capable of carrying out a broader range of functions (both ground attack and 
interception for example), albeit with a lesser ability to carry out its currently 
perceived main function, or indeed any of the functions. 
A corollary of this analysis is that force elements capable of being used 
across a broad range of environments and to meet a broad range of objectives will 
be favoured over force elements which can only be used for narrower tasks.  This 
factor could conceivably result in retention of a specialised defence force (in terms 
of fewer force elements) if the force elements retained were capable of being used 
across a broader range of defence outputs (or environments) than could a more 
‘balanced’ force structure.  Again, balance is related to the tasks that can be 
carried out rather than to any specific structure adopted. 
It is possible though, that a balanced force would so run down the resources 
available to the force element appropriate to a specific environment that the 
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defence output in that environment would be less than the defence output under a 
specialised force structure and less that sufficient to be effective.  In this case, 
even though there is environmental uncertainty and we know that in one 
environment a balanced force will be preferable to a specialised force, the optimal 
force structure is still a specialised force.   
The key result, then, is that environmental (or objective) uncertainty does not 
automatically lead to the favouring of a balanced force even where a balanced 
force is preferable under some environments.  One must still examine the 
opportunity costs under alternative environments (or objectives) of maintaining a 
greater number of force elements. 
Small Country Force Structure:  International Considerations  
We have taken as given that a government will have a number of (possibly 
prioritised) objectives for its defence forces.  We also take it as given that a sine 
qua non of any defence force is to protect the country at least from low-level 
threats to the country’s sovereign integrity (such as terrorism or unauthorised 
incursion into a maritime country’s EEZ).  Beyond this, a country’s optimal 
defence structure will depend on the national factors discussed above and on a 
range of international considerations such as the extent and nature of its alliances, 
and on regional and broader foreign policy objectives to which defence forces 
might contribute. 
This range of potential objectives suggests that decisions about optimal 
defence structure cannot, in general, be made purely by reference to country-
specific factors.  This is so unless the only objective set for the defence force is 
protection of a country’s own sovereignty and even then only if such protection 
does not involve cooperation with other countries.  Once the objective set is 
extended beyond this, a country’s armed forces will necessarily interact with 
forces of other countries.  Hence questions of structures to optimise performance 
in an international environment must be considered. 
For New Zealand, the relationship with Australia is fundamental:  ‘there is no 
strategic relationship closer than that with Australia’ (New Zealand Government, 
2000:6).  The relationship is underpinned by both treaty and explicit policy 
statements, the gist of which are that an attack on either country would be 
considered to be an attack on the other.  The treaty and interest based relationship 
between Australia and New Zealand does not, however, require either country to 
conform to the other in terms of either strategic posture or force structure and 
capabilities.  It does suggest though that close coordination should occur (as it 
does) and that, at the very least, both the capabilities and interests of one country 
should be taken into account by the other when decisions are being taken.  But the 
optimum outcome is not necessarily clear. 
Economic theories of military alliances extend back to the work of Olson and 
Zeckhauser (1966) who discussed ‘deterrence’ as a public good and who noted 
that all lose when defence spending decisions are determined non-cooperatively.  
But small countries are likely to free-ride in such a situation by ‘under-spending’ 
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on defence forces which contribute to mutual deterrence.  Australia has 
‘perceptions — inaccurate or otherwise — of an imbalance of responsibilities that 
each country bears within the bilateral relationship’ (Rolfe, 1999:71).  Indeed 
analyst Paul Dibb (2000) has described New Zealand as being a ‘strategic 
liability’ not a ‘cooperative ally’.  Even if political coordination across allies 
prevents such free-riding, choices for a small country differ from those of a large 
country in terms of whether a country can take other countries’ choices as given.  
In many policy spheres, a small country can take foreign decisions as exogenous 
and then optimise its own decisions given this environment.   
In regional defence where the threat to all members is likely to be similar, 
however, the approach may (or should) be different.  Defence partners (such as 
New Zealand and Australia) routinely discuss appropriate force structures between 
themselves, even if they come to no agreement on what is necessary and what is 
sufficient.  A number of justifications may be used for such an approach.  Firstly, 
there is the issue of interoperability (consistency of equipment and processes 
across forces).  As Sandler and Hartley (1995:223, 339) note, if the forces are to 
work together then a high degree of interoperability is likely to be beneficial.  A 
caveat to this is, of course, where one country (likely to be the smaller) is locked 
into purchasing inferior or more expensive equipment mandated by the regional 
partner, perhaps on the basis that the equipment is produced in that country.  
However, this consideration could be handled via the traditional ‘small country’ 
approach:  the small country observes or is informed of a larger partner’s choices 
and then takes these as given in making its own decisions.  Interoperability per se 
is not a strong argument for cooperation in determining or influencing structures 
across the two countries. 
A second and better reason could be that a given total defence effort of the 
two countries could be achieved at lower cost through coordinating their 
respective structures than if the two countries were to make independent decisions.  
This reflects an economies of scale argument; defence costs and/or outputs with 
international coordination may differ from those without coordination.   
Take a two country case.  One country (Australia, say) is large, and the other 
(New Zealand) is small.  There are two decision-making possibilities:  
independent and coordinated.  In the independent case, New Zealand can observe 
and take Australia’s decisions as given and choose its own defence structure 
accordingly.  Australia must make its choices without necessarily knowing New 
Zealand’s choice.  Without coordination, an inefficiency will result.  If Australia 
for some reason cannot count on New Zealand making a sensible decision, or 
cannot count on it maintaining its ‘fair share’ of expenditure, Australia would have 
to maximise its own defence output to achieve its own needs.  This would result in 
a ‘balanced’ force viewed purely from Australia’s perspective, but not necessarily 
a force balanced for regional security needs.  The same is true for New Zealand.  
If New Zealand takes the resulting Australian force as given, it will find that 
elements of its own forces will be different from their optimal coordinated level.  
Depending on the size of the fixed cost and the nature of the production function, 
it may be optimal (if making decisions independently) for New Zealand also to 
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maintain a full range of force elements, at the expense of additional cost and loss 
of regional balance.  This seems to be the position today. 
In the coordination case, Australia and New Zealand would cooperate to 
achieve a common defence objective.  If the two countries agree on how much 
they are individually willing to spend on defence and can coordinate policy, they 
will maximise their combined defence outputs through fixing the size and 
capabilities of their respective individual services at appropriate aggregate levels, 
and ensuring that the structure of forces across the two countries minimises 
unnecessary fixed costs.  With one large and one small country, this is likely to 
result in the larger country having all capabilities to some level and the smaller 
country specialising.  This is the familiar ‘comparative advantage’ result discussed 
in much of the international trade literature.  Sandler and Hartley (1995:39) also 
note that comparative advantage analysis may lead each country within an alliance 
to specialise in providing sub-sets of security outputs.  This results in a balanced 
force across the two countries.  Both countries gain from the adoption of such a 
force structure compared with the independent decision-making case. 
This gain exists even though it results in an ‘unbalanced’ force (from a single 
country perspective) in New Zealand which no longer has a particular capability.  
It also results in an ‘unbalanced’ force for Australia even though that country has a 
full range of capabilities.  To see this, note that elements of all force elements will 
be provided by Australia, while New Zealand will provide a larger proportion of 
one force element (or a few) than its size dictates; thus Australia has a larger ratio 
of those forces not provided by New Zealand than it would if it were taking a 
force structure decision in isolation. 
Clearly, independent decision-making will be sub-optimal relative to the 
coordination result (if total expenditures are identical).  To see this, note that either 
country may independently decide on the following options: 
 
1. To adopt a force structure with a full range of force elements. 
2. To adopt a limited and specialised force structure. 
 
Option 1 must be inferior to the coordination result since an extra fixed cost 
is incurred which must lower total defence output for any given level of 
expenditure compared with the coordination outcome. 
Option 2 must be inferior to the coordination result (unless that result is 
achieved by accident), even though the fixed cost is not incurred, since some 
elements across the two forces will be below (and others above) the optimal level.  
Hence the combined defence output is not being maximised. 
Importantly therefore, because of the existence of fixed costs, a small country 
can maximise its contribution to a multi-country defence effort by adopting a 
small number of well-prepared force elements; the larger the country, the more 
force elements it will adopt.  Essentially, this is a formal derivation of the 
conjecture by Sandler and Hartley (1995:224) that if NATO members were certain 
that in the event of an attack their allies would respond, each nation would have an 
incentive to specialise in its force structures rather than create a totally 
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independent capability (each nation with an army, navy, air force).  A caveat to 
this result is that it relies on each country having identical objectives and having 
certainty about the responses of its allies in circumstances where combined 
responses are sought.  Without identical objectives or certainty, the case for 
specialisation diminishes — but this is because of a lack of common objectives or 
certainty; not because of a supposed optimality of each country contributing 
‘balanced’ forces to a common defence force.  The case for specialisation also 
diminishes if a government, for political reasons, is committed to maintaining an 
independent defence capability (Sandler and Hartley, 1995:226). 
At the moment Australia and New Zealand make their decisions more-or-less 
independently of each other.  The result is, therefore, sub-optimal in terms of the 
countries combined needs, assuming they have both certainty in the other country 
and more or less identical objectives. 
A Specific Case:  The New Zealand Air Combat Force 
The Army has been the main defence force element contributed by New Zealand 
to international operations since World War Two.  At times New Zealand has also 
contributed ships (for example, frigates to the Multinational Interception Force in 
the Arabian/Persian Gulf) and transport aircraft (especially to carry humanitarian 
relief).  Strike aircraft have been a notable absentee from New Zealand’s 
contribution to international forces over the past three decades despite New 
Zealand having two A4K Skyhawk squadrons.  Strike aircraft were part of New 
Zealand’s commitment to the Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve in the 
1950s and 1960s.  and were used operationally from 1955 to 1960 during the 
Malayan Emergency and deployed in 1964 during Confrontation with Indonesia. 
Despite the lack of operational usage, the air combat force was maintained 
because of its option value.  In 1997 the government (New Zealand Government 
1997), set out an investment path for the NZDF consistent with an explicitly stated 
policy of maintaining a ‘balanced’ defence force.  Balance was most obviously 
demonstrated by defence expenditure which in 1999 (after abstracting from 
headquarters expenses) was allocated 37 per cent to the air-force, 33 per cent to 
the army and 30 per cent to the navy (NZDF, 1999b:19), but was also seen in the 
maintenance of core combat and support elements for each of the services.  
Included as a key element of the investment policy was the intention to ‘lease 28 
F16A/B aircraft.  The aircraft are expected to arrive in early 2001 and will replace 
the 19 A4K Skyhawk aircraft’ (NZDF, 1999b:18). 
A change of government in late-1999 saw a reassessment of this policy.  The 
new government was less wedded to the idea of New Zealand maintaining a 
balanced defence force, wishing to focus on optimising New Zealand’s defence 
contribution, especially in international peacekeeping roles.  Following 
establishment of a committee to investigate the F16 lease deal (headed by a former 
Defence Minister Hon Derek Quigley) which reported favourably on the deal, the 
government decided, in March 2000, not to proceed with the F16 lease.  Prime 
Minister Helen Clark (2000) stated that while ‘the arrangements offered by the 
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United States for the F16s were good ones’, the F16 acquisition was worthwhile 
only ‘provided that expenditure now on upgrading the air combat force was a 
priority and that the Defence Force’s other priorities were also affordable’.  She 
concluded that this was not the case.  In particular (Clark, 2000):  
 
there is no priority setting mechanism in the New Zealand Defence 
Force which effectively and consistently links individual activities or 
projects to the government’s most pressing national security concerns. 
 
This observation indicates that the new government did not consider the 
previous matching of resources to objectives to be adequate (that is, the 
considerations listed earlier in this paper had not been adequately addressed).  In 
background analysis of the F16 deal, Grimes (2000) demonstrated some of the 
trade-offs incurred in New Zealand maintaining an air strike capacity.  That 
analysis assumed that New Zealand could not realistically scale down the existing 
capacity; that is, it assumed that an air combat force of 19 aircraft is the minimum 
required level for the force to exist in a meaningful fashion.  Thus the policy 
choice (consistent with the discussion above) is either to discontinue the force or 
to keep it at least its current capacity.  If the force were discontinued and if 
aggregate defence funding were maintained constant, the analysis indicates that: 
 
• ready reaction and other army forces could be increased by at least 30 per 
cent;5 or 
• at least an additional frigate could be added to the (3-frigate) navy; or  
• maritime patrol forces could be more than doubled. 
 
The air combat force has been disbanded and the government has taken 
decisions to increase total defence expenditure slightly and to substantially bolster 
the army’s equipment but not to materially increase that of either the navy or air 
force, although patrol craft and a multi-role vessel for the Navy will be acquired.   
The issue resulted in extensive discussions with Australian defence planners.  
Official Australian reaction to New Zealand’s decision to remove the air combat 
force has been largely negative, in part because a key role for New Zealand’s 
strike aircraft included its ‘contribution to the defence of Northern Australia’ 
(Wilson-Roberts, 2000; NZDF, 1999b:14) and in part because of a more 
generalised belief, alluded to earlier, that any diminution of New Zealand’s 
defence capacity is in itself a threat to Australia. 
                                                     
5Grimes (2000) also demonstrates that ready reaction and other army force expenditure is 
much more labour-intensive than is air combat expenditure.  The ratio of labour:total 
expenditure for the ready reaction and related forces is 49 per cent compared with 28 per 
cent for air combat forces; capital:total expenditure ratios are almost reversed.  Given a 
public policy desire to increase training and employment of lower skilled workers, and a 
desire to cut imports, a transfer of expenditure from combat aircraft to army forces 
therefore potentially results in other public policy benefits. 
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From our analysis above, the Australian objection possibly rests on faulty 
analysis.  Australia, seven times New Zealand’s size, has a sizeable air combat 
capability.  If the two countries could coordinate their defence efforts, it is likely 
to be optimal for Australia to enlarge its air strike capability by the 20 or so 
combat aircraft currently retained by New Zealand (reducing its other forces 
commensurately), leaving New Zealand to enlarge its ready reaction and other 
army forces by over 30 per cent so as to contribute more strongly to situations 
such as in East Timor and Bougainville.  It appears that, in practice, the New 
Zealand decision is leading to an increase in the capacity (if not the total numbers) 
of Australia’s air combat force as most of New Zealand’s air and ground crews are 
moving to join the Royal Australian Air Force, thus relieving shortages in that 
force.   
Conclusions 
A small country must decide not only the scale of its armed forces, but also their 
scope.  Inevitably, the smaller a country’s defence expenditure, the smaller will be 
the number of force elements which it can maintain at credible operational levels.  
Factors which will influence the choice of force structure for a small country 
include:  the nature of defence objectives; the nature of international cooperation 
amongst national defence forces; the overall level of funding for the armed forces 
in conjunction with technological factors including the size of fixed costs for each 
force element; and the degree and nature of environmental uncertainty. 
As we move down the continuum of country size, a country must, if it is to 
establish an optimal force structure, choose to forego defence force elements that 
would be considered an integral part of the defence force of a larger country.  This 
does not necessarily signify a lack of commitment to defence on the part of such a 
small country.  If anything, it signifies the opposite:  a country that is willing to 
increase its defence contribution by reducing its number of force elements is 
showing an increased commitment to defence outputs (but not to certain defence 
careers) given limited resources. 
Discontinuing existing force elements, even where this is the optimal path, is 
subject to potentially severe public choice objections.  ‘Informed sources’ — both 
domestic and international — may oppose an optimal reprioritisation of defence 
expenditure, especially where this involves the scrapping of one or more force 
elements.  Governments must then make a decision as to whether to follow a path 
of optimal resource allocation or a path of least resistance.   
Experience suggests that the latter path often predominates.  From New 
Zealand (and other countries’) experience, it is likely to take a brave government 
to decide explicitly to reduce the number of force elements.  A more likely 
scenario (if the ‘buggins turn’ approach is not adopted) is a long-term run-down in 
capability of one or more force elements.  While this approach retains an option to 
revitalise that capability in future (more cheaply than if it had been totally 
discontinued), it is only a second best alternative to discontinuation where the 
latter is optimal.  The latter approach may enable substantial savings in fixed costs 
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that could be allocated to enlarge the contributions of other existing force 
elements.  Therefore a choice of defence structure which may on the surface 
appear the least supportive for defence (that is, discontinuation of a force element) 
could prove instead to be a significant contributor to bolstering defence outputs.   
This analysis has shown that although New Zealand has apparently reduced 
the capacity of its armed forces, in practice it might well have increased not only 
its own overall utility (because proper attention will be paid to the Army which 
will become more effective) but also that of elements of Australia’s.  If that is the 
case, then there is considerable scope for the two countries to consider other areas 
for the armed forces to complement each other (in counter-terrorist capabilities 
perhaps, or for the defence of northern Australia) and for the total defence effort of 
the two countries to be enhanced.  This would mean a degree of specialisation, 
more so by New Zealand than Australia.  But given that each country is more or 
less specialised in any case, this would make explicit what is already implicit.  A 
greater barrier is likely to be the question of ‘sovereignty’ and independence.  If 
the two countries join their armed forces either functionally or at a higher 
political/constitutional level there will be cries that one or other country has 
relinquished sovereignty and independence of action.  The question of trust and 
free-riding will also be raised, especially by Australia.  These are serious issues, 
but they are capable of being resolved.   
There are advantages to be gained if the two countries could cooperate in 
their defence planning.  There are some caveats of course.  Each country would 
have to be certain of the other’s good faith and they would have to be able to agree 
on a common set (and understanding) of defence objectives.  These should not be 
insurmountable problems.  The two countries are closer in outlook and capacity 
than almost any two others.  The two countries already have an economic 
relationship that is getting ever closer and where that economic relationship has 
already gone is suitable ground to consider the destination for the defence 
relationship. 
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